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BANKRUPTCY LAW 
IN RE CHG INTERNATIONAL, 
INCORPORATED: THE ORDINARY 
COURSE OF BUSINESS EXCEPTION; 
WHAT YOU SEE IS WHAT YOU GET 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
In re CHG International, Inc., 1 announced the Ninth 
Circuit's interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2), the "Ordinary 
Course of Business" exception to a preferential transfer.2 The 
CHG court examined the legislative history and the underly-
ing policies behind section 547, and determined that the 1984 
amendment was intended to exclude long-term debt from the 
exception, even though the amendment deleted the forty five 
day time limitation.s Subsequently, relying on the CHG ruling, 
the Ninth Circuit decided In re ZZZZ Best Co., Inc.,4 again hold-
ing that long-term debts did not fall within the Ordinary 
Course of Business exception.5 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to ZZZZ Best, and reversed the Ninth Circuit 
interpretation of section 54 7(c)(2). 6 This article will examine the 
1. In re CHG Int.'l, Inc., 897 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1989) (per Browning, J.; the other 
panel members were Alcaron, J., and Hall, J.). 
2. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1487. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). A pref-
erence is a payment to a unsecured or undersecured creditor within ninety days prior 
to filing for bankruptcy, on an antecedent debt, which places the creditor in a better finan-
cial position than the debtor's other creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
3. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1487. 
4. 921 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Union Bank v. Wolas, Chapter 7 
Trustee for the Estate ofZZZZ Best Co. Inc., 50 U.S. _,112 S. Ct. 527 (1991). 
5. ZZZZ Best, 921 F.2d at 969. The ZZZZ Best case involved a preferential trans-
fer made to a creditor on an eight month line of credit. ZZZZ Best, 921 F.2d at 968. The 
Ninth Circuit determined that the eight month line of credit constituted long term 
debt. lei. at 969. In comparison, the CHG court, while not ruling specifically on what time 
period constitutes long term debt, found that the one year and seven month notes were 
long term debts. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1484. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
6. In re Z'CZZ Best Co., Inc., 921 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Union Bank 
v. Wolas, Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate ofZZZZ Best Co., Inc., 50 U.S. _,112 S. 
Ct. 527 (1991). "In sum, we hold that payments on long-term debts, as well as payments 
on short-term debt, may qualify for the ordinary course of business exception to the 
trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers." Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. 533. 
31 
1
Elder: Bankruptcy Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
32 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:31 
Ninth Circuit opinion of In re CHG,7 and discuss the Supreme 
Court ruling and its implications. 
II. FACTUAL STATEMENT 
In re eRG, involved several banking transactions between 
the debtor, CHG International ("CHG") and Barclays Bank PLC 
("Barclays").8 Barclays made two loans to CHG, which were the 
subject of the preference action.9 Initially, Barclays advanced 
a one-year line of credit to CHG up to $1,200,000, secured by 
a pledged certificate of deposit in the amount of $1,200,000.10 
This "CD" loan was renewed several times. 11 
Barclays made a formal demand for payment the day before 
the promissory note became due. 12 Barclays advised CHG of its 
intention to foreclose on its security if the note were not paid. 13 
CHG made a $14,224.99 interest payment on the CD loan, 
within ninety days of the filing ofCHG's Chapter 11 petition. 14 
Barclays made a second loan of$1,000,000 to CHG.16 This 
"real estate" loan was also evidenced by a promissory note 
requiring CHG to make monthly interest payments, with the 
principal coming due in seven months. 16 CHG granted Barclays 
a deed of trust on eighty five acres of undeveloped waterfront 
7. 897 F.2d 1479 (1990). 
8. CHG, 897 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1990). CHG is a Washington Corporation 
involved in real estate development. [d. Barclays is a British bank doing business in 
Seattle, Washington. [d. 
9. [d. at 1480. At the time ofCHG's bankruptcy filing both loans were underse-
cured. [d. 
10. [d. CHG executed a promissory note, which required CHG to make month-
ly interest payments on the unpaid principal balance. [d. Westside Federal Savings 
and Loan held the Certificate of Deposit. [d. 
11. [d. CHG continued to make its monthly interest payments under the first note 
during the renewal periods. [d. CHG only missed one monthly interest payment on the 
CD loan. [d. 
12. [d. 
13. [d. CHG contacted Westside, who held the CD and requested Westside to cash 
the CD and transfer the proceeds to Barelays. [d. Due to a penalty for early withdrawal, 
the value ofthe CD was reduced to $1,164,126.32. [d. 
14. [d. This was the first so-called preferential transfer. [d. CHG filed for 
bankruptcy protection on December 6, 1986, therefore any transfer to a creditor 
after September 6, fell within the ninety day preference period. [d. 
16. [d. This was a seven month term loan, secured by a deed of trust on real prop-
erty. [d. CHG held an executory real estate contract on the Vashon Property. [d. at 
1480·81. 
16. [d. Barclays held a deed of trust that was junior to a deed of trust granted 
to Westside, securing a loan in the approximate amount of $2,000,000. [d. Barclays 
was also junior to the interest of several contract vendors. [d. at 1481. 
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property, known as the Vashon property, valued at $500,000.17 
At the time ofCRG's bankruptcy filing, the principal of the sec-
ond loan had not been reduced. 1S 
The eighty five acres of undeveloped land was appraised as 
part of a larger parcel containing 127 acres. 19 CRG defaulted 
on the underlying real estate contract subsequently forfeiting 
its interest in the Vashon property to the numerous contract 
vendors who were owed $350,000.20 
As additional security for the second loan, CRG executed 
an additional note for $500,000, secured by a deed of trust on 
a second parcel of real estate, known as the Richland prop-
erty.21 This deed of trust was subordinate to a deed of trust 
granted to Washington Mutual Savings and Loan, securing a 
loan in the principal amount of $2,122,500. 22 The Richland 
property was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale under the 
Washington Mutual deed of trust and purchased by Washington 
for $2,351,041.97.23 
In the course of the loan interest payments, CRG misses 
only one payment under the first and the second loan.24 CRG 
made an interest payment to Barclays on the second real 
estate loan which was within the ninety day preference 
period.26 
17. [d. at 1480-81. This property was located on Vashon Island and was purchased 
by CHG under a separate, executory real estate contract. [d. Barclays held a deed of 
trust that was junior to a deed of trust granted to Westside, securing a loan in the 
approximate amount of $2,000,000. [d. Barclays was also junior to the interest of sev-
eral contract vendors. [d. at 1481. 
18. [d. CHG filed its voluntary petition on December 5, 1985, and the second note 
was due on December 28, 1984. [d. 
19. [d. The market value for the entire 127 acres was no more than $510,000. [d. 
CHG only held title to 85 acres out of the 127. [d. 
20. [d. This wiped out Barclays' security interest in the property, rendering 
Barclays undersecured. [d. 
21. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1481. The second parcel of real estate was located in 
Richland, Washington. [d. 
22. [d. Washington Mutual held the first deed of trust on the Richland proper-
ty securing a loan to CHG. [d. 
23. [d. The noI\iudicial foreclosure wiped out Barclays' junior interest in this prop-
erty leaving Barclays unsecured on its second loan to CHG. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The date ofCHG's 
voluntary filing was December 5, 1984, therefore, the preference period extended back 
to include any payments made after September 6, 1984. See supra note 14. See also 
note 2, for a definition of a preference. 
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CHG filed its petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code on December 5, 1984.26 Two 
years later, CHG filed an adversary complaint in the bankrupt-
cy court alleging that it was entitled to recover the two inter-
est payments made to Barclays within the ninety day preference 
period pursuant to section 547(b).27 Barclays brought a motion 
for summary judgment based on its affirmative defense, the 
ordinary course of business exception. 28 The bankruptcy court 
denied the motion, finding as a matter of law that section 
547(c)(2), the ordinary course of business exception to prefer-
ences, was not available to Barclays because the subject debts 
were long-term loans not ordinary trade credits. 29 The bank-
ruptcy court granted CHG's counter motion for summary judg-
ment, characterizing the two interest payments as preferences, 
and awarding judgment against Barclays in the total amount 
of $30,007.55, including prejudgment interest and costs. 30 
Barclays appealed to the district court, this time conceding 
that the interest payments were preferential transfers, but con-
testing the finding that the payments did not fall into the 
ordinary course of business exception.31 Agreeing with Barclays' 
position, the district court held that section 547(c)(2) did 
include long-term debt. 32 CHG then appealed the District 
court's findings to the Ninth Circuit.33 
,. 
26. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1481. CHG filed its voluntary petition pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 301, which provides: 
A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced 
by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under 
such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under such 
chapter. The commencement of a voluntary case under a 
chapter of this title constitutes an order for relief under 
such chapter. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
27. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1481. Barclays argued that the payments were not pref-
erential and asserted an affirmative defense maintaining that the payments fell 
within the ordinary course of business exception to the avoidance of preferential 
transfers.ld. Section 547(b) grants the authority to recover property for the benefit 
of the bankruptcy estate as part of the debtor's general powers of avoidance. 11 
U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982). 
28. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1481. 
29. Id. The court relied on the pre-1984 language of §547(c) which required 
forty-five days in accordance with trade billing cycles.ld. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) 
(1982), which provided: "made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred." 
Id. 
30. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1481 n.l. 
31. Id. at 1481. 
32. In re CHG Int'l., Inc., 87 B.R. 647 (W.D. Wash. 1988) relJ'd 897 F.2d 1479 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (relying on In re Iowa Premium Service Co. Fuel and Oil Supply, 695 F.2d 
1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Terminaling, Inc., 72 B.R. 752, 762 (S.D. Tex. 1987». 
33. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1481. 
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. 11 U.S.C. § 547(B); PREFERENCE 
Section 547(b) gives a trustee or debtor in possession the 
power to avoid certain transfers of the debtor's property made 
within ninety days prior to filing bankruptcy, which results in a 
benefit to one creditor, to the detriment of other creditors.34 The 
preference rules were designed to ensure an orderly and equitable 
distribution of payments to the debtor's creditors within the 
months immediately preceding the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion.35 Without this protection there is the risk that the debtor's 
bankruptcy estate or property might be depleted by major cred-
itors or that creditors would "race to the courthouse" to dis-
member the debtor during its decline into bankruptcy.36 
However, the bankruptcy code contains seven exceptions to 
the preference rule which allow the debtor to obtain some 
credit prior to bankruptcy and allow creditors to retain pay-
ments for certain types of transactions immediately prior to 
bankruptcy.37 If the seven exceptions of section 547(c) were not 
available, the debtor's probability of sliding into bankruptcy, 
during severe financial troubles, would greatly increase.38 
34. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), provides: 
"The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property -
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the 
debtor before such transfer was made; 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of 
the petition; or 
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date 
of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the 
time of such transfer was an insider; and 
(5) That enables such creditor to receive more than such 
creditor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the 
extent provided by the provisions of this title." Id. 
35. In the Matter ofXonics Imaging, Inc., 837 F.2d 763,765 (7th Cir. 1988). See 
generally McCoid, Bankruptcy Preferences and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 
VA. L. REV. 249 (1981). 
36. In re Hancock Nelson Mercantile Co., Inc., 122 B.R. 1006, 1010 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 1991). See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Congo 1st Sess. 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5874, 6329. 
37. Xonics, 837 F.2d at 765-66. See generally 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(1)-(7) (1982 & 
Supp. III 1985). 
38. Xonics, 837 F.2d at 765; Hancock, 122 B.R. at 1010. 
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B. ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS EXCEPTION 
In re CHG, discussed section 547(c)(2) which is commonly 
referred to as the ordinary course of business exception to a 
preferential transfer. 39 Section 547(c)(2) allows a creditor to 
except a preferential transfer if the transfer was in payment 
of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business of the 
debtor and the transferee and the transfer was made accord-
ing to ordinary business terms.40 
Prior to the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the 
Bankruptcy Act did not contain a comparable provision to section 
547(c)(2).41 Instead, the courts created the "Current Expense" 
rule.42 The current expense rule covered situations in which the 
debtor's payments to a creditor, immediately preceding bank-
ruptcy, did not diminish the estate, because the debtor received 
tangible goods in the exchange.43 The overhaul of the bankruptcy 
system in 1978 created three comparable subsections." 
39. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1482-84. See supra note 2 for an explanation of a preference. 
40. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2), which provides: 
(2) to the extent that such transfer was: 
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordi-
nary course of business or financial affairs of the 
debtor and the transferee; 
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial 
affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and 
(C) made according to ordinary business terms.ld. 
See H.R. REP. No. 5174, 98th Cong., Pub. L. 98-353. See also CHG at 1483 n.3, for a 
brief discussion of the section 547(c)(2) legislative evolution. 
41. See § 60 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, as amended and codified in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 96 (1976). This section provides in relevant part: 
"(a)(l) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of 
any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a cred-
itor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered 
by such debtor while insolvent and within four months 
before the filing by or against him the petition initiating a 
proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will 
be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of 
his debt than some other creditor of the same class. 
(b) Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the 
creditor receiving it or to be benefitted thereby or his agent 
acting with reference thereto has, at the time when the 
transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor 
is insolvent. Where the preference is voidable, the trustee 
may recover the property .... " Id. 
42. National Bank of Jacksonville, 112 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1940); 3 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY 'i 60.23 (14th ed. 1977). 
43. Jacksonville, 112 F.2d at 382. 
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See infra 
note 60 for a definition of the contemporaneous exchange rule. 
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As originally enacted in 1978, section 547(c)(2) contained 
an additional element requiring that the payment, to the cred-
itor, occurred within forty-five days after the debt was 
incurred.40 The forty-five day rule was designed to allow pay-
ments of essentially short-term trade credit.'6 The rule was 
designed to leave undisturbed normal financial relationships, 
and resulted from the House Judiciary Committee's judgment 
that thirty days represented the normal credit term, with an 
additional fifteen day period for preparation of a bill and pay-
ment by the debtor.47 
In 1984, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Amendment and 
Federal Judgeship Act ("BAFJA"), Congress amended the code 
to eliminate the forty-five day limitation." The BAFJA was 
necessitated by the Supreme Court ruling in Northern Pipeline 
Construction Company v. Marathon Pipeline CO.,'9 holding the 
bankruptcy jurisdictional system unconstitutiona1.60 By remov-
ing the forty-five day limitation, and not imposing a new or 
different time requirement, Congress appeared to have expand-
ed the protection of section 547(c)(2) to a potentially wide vari-
ety of transactions which it previously deemed unworthy of 
protection.61 Because the section did not contain a time con-
straint, arguably all debts, both long-term and short-term, 
could fall into the section, as long as the debts could meet the 
other remaining requirements of the section.62 
45. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1982). See supra note 29. See also Fidelity Savings 
and Investment Co. v. New Hope Baptist, 880 F.2d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 1989). 
46. In re Finn, 909 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1990). 
47. Broome, Payment on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of 
the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendment, 1987 DUKE L. J. 78, 97 (1987) [hereinafter Broome]. 
See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Congo 1st Sess. 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6329; SEN R. No. 989, 95th Congo 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in 1978 
U.S. CONGo CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 5787,5874. 
48. H.R. REP. No. 5174, 98th Cong., Pub. L. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). See CHG 
897 F.2d at 1483. 
49. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
50. Marathon, 458 U.S. 50,87 (1982);" We conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 
ed. & Supp. IV), as added by § 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has impermissi-
ble removed most, if not all, of the "essential attributes of the judicial power" from the 
Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a 
grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress' power to create 
adjuncts to Art. III courts.- Id. See App. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPI'CY, 'i XX-I (15th ed. 1988). 
51. Morris, Substantive Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in the Bankruptcy 
Amendments Act of 1984,27 WM & MARy L. REV. 91, 122- 123 (1985). (arguing that the 
1984 amendment expands protection of Section 547(c)(2) to "virtually all timely pay-
ments of installment obligations-). The leading bankruptcy treatise states that it is 
arguable that the elimination of the forty-five day limit allows long-term debt to be 
excepted. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, '1547.10 (15th ed. 1988). 
52. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1483 n.5. 
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The forty-five day rule was criticized as overbroad and 
underbroad, both too vague and too precise.63 The argument was 
that the rule was vague because it was too difficult to tell 
when a debt was incurred; it was too precise because it was 
designed to reflect the thirty day billing cycle plus the fifteen 
day invoicing cycle, and it was rigidly insensitive to variations 
in business practices.64 
Congress hastily eliminated the forty-five day requirement 
from the ordinary course of business exception, due in part, to 
Congress' preoccupation with the jurisdictional crisis facing the 
bankruptcy court system resulting from the Supreme Court rul-
ing in Marathon, that the bankruptcy jurisdictional system 
was unconstitutional.66 The legislative history accompanying the 
1984 amendment to section 547(c) is scant and it is unclear how 
Congress intended the deletion to affect the application of the 
section. 56 Neither the House nor the Senate held hearings on the 
bill. 67 However, the Congressional record contains statements 
from senators Dole and DeConcini, pertaining to the elimina-
tion of the forty-five day requirement, stating that the amend-
ment to section 547 will relieve buyers of commercial paper with 
maturities in excess of forty-five days from the charges ofpref-
erential transfers. 68 
53. In re Control Electric, 91 B.R. 1010, 1013 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). See 
Broome, supra note 47 at 100; Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, 
and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3,129-130 (1987) [here-
inafter Weisberg]. See also Fortgang & King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some 
Wrong Decisions, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1148, 1167-70 (1981). 
54. Weisberg, supra note 53 at 130 n.529. 
55. H.R. REP. No. 5174, 98th Congo 1st Sess. Pub. L. 98-353. See supra notes 48-
50 and accompanying text; Marathon, 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982). 
56. In re Control Electric, 91 B.R. 1010, 1013 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); In re 
Finn, 909 F.2d 903, 906 (6th Cir.1990); CHG, 897 F.2d at 1484. 
57. Broome, supra note 47 at 88. 
58. 130 CONGo REC. S. 8887, 8897 (1987); Fidelity Savings and Investment Co.v. 
New Hope Baptist, 880 F.2d 1172, 1180 (10th Cir. 1989). See App 3 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY' XX-80 (15th ed. 1988); 
DeConcini: "I know that the Senator from Kansas, along 
with the Senator from South Carolina, was the principal 
sponsor of this provision deleting subsection (c)(2) of section 
547 of the Code, and I would like to clarify two points regard-
ing the effect of this change. 
Am I correct that the elimination of the 45-day restriction in 
subsection (c)(2) of section 547 will relieve buyers of com-
mercial paper with maturities in excess of 45 days of the con-
cern that repayments of such paper at maturity might be 
considered as preferential transfers? 
Dole: That is correct, assuming that the ordinary course of 
business or financial affairs and ordinary business terms 
requirements are met." Id. 
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IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit relied upon the 1978 and 1984 legislative 
history of section 547(c)(2).69 First, the court examined whether 
Congress in 1984, by eliminating the forty-five day require-
ment, intended to fundamentally change the scope of the ordi-
nary course exception to include more than transactions which 
were substantially contemporaneous exchanges.6o The court 
examined the legislative history, the commentators and cases, 
and concluded that the correct view was that section 547(c)(2) 
did not apply to long-term loans.61 
Analyzing the 1984 amendment to section 547(c)(2), the 
court found that Congress initially used the forty-five day 
period because it believed the forty-five days reflected the 
typical billing cycle of transactions intended to qualify with-
in the exception.62 The forty-five day limit was widely criticized 
by consumer lenders, trade creditors and paper issuers, as 
not accurately reflecting their billing cycles, therefore, Congress 
eliminated the requirement.63 The court points out that a 
literal and superficial reading of the rule allows long-term 
debt to fall within the exception." 
However, the court observed that the majority of cases 
hold that section 547(c)(2) does not apply to long-term loans.66 
These cases found that either Congress did not intend section 
547(c)(2) to except long-term debt from avoidance, long-term 
debt is not incurred in a debtor's ordinary course of business, 
or both.66 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Bourgeois court 
reasoning, that Congress did not intend to change the spirit of 
59. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1482-84. 
60. Id. at 1483. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (the contem-
poraneous exchange rule). A contemporaneous exchange occurs when the debtor 
pays the creditor almost simultaneously within receipt of the goods. Id. 
61. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1482. "[We] conclude that interest payments on long-
term debt were not intended to be covered under the ordinary course of business excep-
tion .... " Id. 
62. Id. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
63. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1482. 
64. Id. at 1484. However, the court opposed a literal reading based on its inter-
pretation of Congress's intent in eliminating the forty-five day requirement in 1984. 
Id. at 1483- 84. 
65. Id. (relying on In re Bourgeois, 58 B.R. 657 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986); In re RDC 
Corp., 88 B.R. 97 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1988); In re Jackson, 90 B.R. 793 (Bankr. D.S.C. 
1988); In re Control Electric, 91 B.R. 1010,1017 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988». 
66. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1484. 
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the section from dealing mainly with trade credit transac-
tions which are substantially contemporaneous exchanges.67 
The Bourgeois court found that to hold such payments on 
long-term loans as within the ordinary course of business with-
in the meaning of section 547(c)(2) "would be to flout the clear 
intent of that subsection, and the entire policy of the preference 
provisions as a whole. "68 Such a holding would virtually strip the 
preference provisions of the Code of all meaning. 69 To further 
explain its holding, the Ninth Circuit argued that if the excep-
tion were to include long-term debt, the effect of the preference 
provision would be neutralized by allowing almost every kind 
of payment a debtor makes during the ninety day period. 70 
The court found that the majority of courts that considered 
whether long-term debt fell within the exception after the 
1984 amendment, followed Bourgeois.71 In re RDC Corp.,72 
maintained that long-term loans were antecedent debts in the 
traditional sense because the monthly payments of interest 
did not represent ongoing trade transactions.73 The decision 
67. Id. Bourgeois, 58 B.R. at 657. The Bourgeois court held that principal and 
interest payments by the debtor to a bank on long-term loans were not intended by 
the 1984 Amendment to fall within section 547(c)(2). Id. at 660. In Bourgeois, the 
trustee brought a preference action against Bank of Lafayette and Guaranty Bank & 
Trust.Id. Similar to Barc1ays in CHG, the bank did not dispute that the elements of 
section 547(b) were met. Id. Instead, their argument maintained that the payments 
fell within section 547(c)(2), the ordinary course of business exception. Id. See supra 
note 60 for definition of contemporaneous exchange. 
68. Bourgeois, 58 B.R. at 660. The court felt that due to the lack oflegislative his-
tory surrounding the deletion of the forty five day rule, it had the authority to define 
the meaning and scope of the ordinary course of business exception in light of the 
amendment.Id. The court examined the goals and purposes behind section 547(b) and 
section 547(c)(2) and determined that Congress did not intend to fundamentally 
change the scope of the exception. Id. "The forty five day limit was eliminated so that 
the provisions of the Code would comport with normal business policies." Id. The court 
was of the opinion that the 1984 amendment removed only an arbitrary time limit, and 
that the spirit and intent of section 547(c)(2), i.e. the exemption from avoidance of trade 
credit transactions which are substantially contemporaneous exchanges, remained the 
same.Id. at 660-661. 
69. Id. at 662. 
70. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1484. In effect, the court was arguing that by including long-
term debt into the exception, the exception would swallow the rule. Id. 
71. Id. at 1485. (citing In re ROC Corp., 88 B.R. 97 (Bankr. W.O. La. 1988); In 
re Jackson, 90 B.R. 793, (Bankr. D.S.C. 1988); In re Control Electric, Inc., 91 B.R. 1010 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988». 
72. 88 B.R. 97 (Bankr. W.O. La. 1988). 
73. RDC Corp., 88 B.R. at 97 (citing Lingley v. Stuart Shaines, Inc. (In re Acme-
Dunham Inc.), 50 B.R. 734, 741-42 (D.C. Me. 1985). An antecedent debt is a debt, owed 
by the debtor to the creditor, prior to the transfer to the creditor. See In re Comark, 
124 B.R. 806, 811 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991). 
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to pay them was made far in advance of the payment, at the 
time the loan was negotiated, and nothing is exchanged at the 
time of payment which helps the debtor to continue In 
business.74 
The court also addressed the issue of when the obligation 
to pa'y interest arose. 76 The court noted that under 
Washington law the obligation to pay interest arose when the 
promissory notes were signed, not when the interest pay-
ments were made.76 In the district court, Barclays advanced 
the argument that the payment of interest was essentially a 
contemporaneous exchange, because the interest payments 
were incurred monthly when they became due.77 In re Western 
World Funding78 had previously rejected this argument, 
holding that a debt for principal and interest is incurred at 
the signing of the promissory note and the completion of 
the transfer of funds to the debtor. 79 
The court reversed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for Barclays and remanded to the district court with 
orders to reinstate the bankruptcy court's judgment in favor of 
CRG.80 The court found specifically that Congress did not 
intend section 547(c)(2) to include payment on long-term debt.81 
V. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS 
On December 11, 1991, the United States Supreme Court 
handed down a unanimous ruling on Union Bank V. Wolas,82 
announcing the correct interpretation of section 547(c)(2).83 
74. Acme-Dunham, 50 B.R. at 741-42. 
75. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1486. 
76. Id. See Pedersen v. Fisher, 139 Wash. 28, 32, 245 P. 30, 32 (1926). 
77. In re CHG Int.l, Inc., 87 B.R. 647, 653 (W.D. Wash 1988). 
78. 54 B.R. 470 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985). 
79. Western World, 54 B.R. at 477. The court in Western World, applied pre-1984 
BAFJA law to the case, because the case was filed in 1982. [d. at 470. The debtor made 
substantial interest and principal payments to several creditors within the ninety day 
preference period prior to filing bankruptcy. Id. at 473. The creditors advanced the 
argument that the receipt of principal and interest was not on account of an antecedent 
debt [547(b)(2)] because the debt was incurred when it is due, not at time of the sign-
ing of the loan. Id. at 477. However, the court held that as soon as the promissory notes 
were signed, and the funds were transferred to the debtor, the creditor had a claim 
against the debtor. Id. 
80. CHG 897 F.2d at 1487. 
81. Id. 
82. 50 U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991). 
83. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. 527. 
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Certiori was granted because of a conflict, between the Ninth 
and Sixth Circuits, in interpretating the section.1U The Court 
held that section 547(c)(2) applied to long-term as well as 
short-term debts, overruling the Ninth Circuit approach and 
ZZZZ Best. 86 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
1. Textual Analysis 
First, the Court examined the text of the section, and 
determined that the most telling feature of section 54 7( c)(2) 
was the absence of any language distinguishing between long-
term debt and short-term debt.86 The Court noted that the sec-
tion focused on whether the debt was incurred, and payment 
made, in the ordinary course of business, rather than focus-
ing on a time limitation.87 The clarity of the text imposed a 
heavy burden of persuading the Court that Congress intend-
ed to create or preserve a special rule for long-term debt.88 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the text provided no sup-
port for interpreting a distinction between long-term and 
short-term debt. 89 
2. Legislative History 
The Court went on to examine the legislative history sur-
rounding the 1978 enactment of section 547(c)(2),90 and the 1984 
BAFJA amendments. 9 ! First, the Court analyzed the 1984 
amendment. 92 The Court did not dispute the accuracy of the 
intent of the legislators in deleting the time limitation. 93 
Instead, the Court reasoned that even though Congress may not 
have foreseen all of the consequences of the amendment, that 
84. Id. at 529. See In re Finn, 909 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1990) (interpreting section 
547(c)(2) to include long.term debt). 
85. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 533. 
86. Id. at 530. 
87.Id. 
88. Id. (citing U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989». 
89. Id. at 530. 
90. Id. at 530-31. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
91. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 531. Bankruptcy Amendment and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 95-353, 98 Stat. 333. . 
92. Union Bank, at 531. 
93. [d. 
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alone was not enough to refuse to give effect to the plain 
meaning of the section.94 
N ext, the Court addressed the history of the voidable pref-
erence prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 
1978.96 The Court discredited the argument that section 
547(c)(2) was created as the statutory equivalent of the "cur-
rent expense" rule.96 Notably, the Court examined the other 
exceptions of section 547(c) which resolved a majority of the sit-
uations covered by the current expense rule. 97 The Court stat-
ed that additionally, Congress carefully examined the entire 
area of preferences and the exceptions when it completely 
rewrote the provisions in 1978.98 Therefore, the text of section 
547(c)(2) was a deliberate choice.99 
3. Policy Argument 
Lastly, the Court examined the policy implications associ-
ated with section 547(c)(2), holding that the two basic inter-
twined polices, detering a race to the courthouse, and equality 
of distribution, did not warrant a distinction between long 
and short-term debt. loo The Court noted the equal distribution 
policy arguably supported the distinction. lol However, because 
the statutory text made no distinction, it precluded an analy-
sis that separated the two policies. lo2 
The Court determined that the second policy applied 
equally to long and short-term creditors and indirectly fur-
thers the goal of equal distribution. lo3 Therefore, the Court 
was unwilling to follow the district court and the court of 
appeals conclusion that the policies behind section 547(c)(2) 
supported the distinction between long and short-term 
debt. lo4 
94. [d. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. at 532. See supra notes 42·44 and accompanying text. 
97. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 532. See 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(1)·(c)(7) (1982 & Supp. 
III 1985). See supra note 60 for an explanation of section 547(c)(1). 
98. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 532. See supra notes 45·47 and accompanying text. 
99. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 532·33. 
100. [d. at 533. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. 
104. [d. 
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B. CONCURRING OPINION 
Justice Scalia concurred with the result reached by the 
majority.lo6 However, Justice Scalia noted that it was regret-
table that our legal culture credited and allowed such argu-
ments to be addressed, when the statute was so "utterly devoid" 
of language that could remotely distinguish between long-
term and short-term debt. lOS 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By overruling the Ninth Circuit interpretation of section 
547, the Supreme Court demonstrated its propensity to support 
the plain meaning doctrine. Justice Scalia's concurring opin-
ion chided the legal system for supporting an argument based 
on sketchy legislative interpretation and policy. The Supreme 
Court decision, signals that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and the 
subsequent amendments should be construed literally. 
Janina M. Elder* 
105. Id. at 534 (joining the majority in Parts II and III, responding to the leg· 
islative history). 
106. Id. "Since there was no contention of a "scrivener's error" producing an 
absurd result, the plain text of the statute should have made this litigation unnecessary 
and unmaintainable." Id. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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